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Super Soldiers (Part 2):
The Ethical, Legal, and 
Operational Implications
ABSTRACT
This is the second chapter of two on military human enhancement. In the first chapter, the authors outlined 
past and present efforts aimed at enhancing the minds and bodies of our warfighters with the broader 
goal of creating the “super soldiers” of tomorrow, all before exploring a number of distinctions—natu-
ral vs. artificial, external vs. internal, enhancement vs. therapy, enhancement vs. disenhancement, and 
enhancement vs. engineering—that are critical to the definition of military human enhancement and 
understanding the problems it poses. The chapter then advanced a working definition of enhancement 
as efforts that aim to “improve performance, appearance, or capability besides what is necessary to 
achieve, sustain, or restore health.” It then discussed a number of variables that must be taken into 
consideration when applying this definition in a military context. In this second chapter, drawing on 
that definition and some of the controversies already mentioned, the authors set out the relevant ethical, 
legal, and operational challenges posed by military enhancement. They begin by considering some of 
the implications for international humanitarian law and then shift to US domestic law. Following that, 
the authors examine military human enhancement from a virtue ethics approach, and finally outline 
some potential consequences for military operations more generally.
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INTRODUCTION
With the background and working definition 
provided in the previous chapter (Chapter 7), we 
begin our discussion of the primary ethical, legal 
and operational issues associated with military 
human enhancement. At this point, it must be 
said that to the extent that ethics underwrites 
law and policy, we are often better placed to 
understand the former by looking at the latter as 
the real-world implementation of ethics. This is 
also beneficial in the sense that international and 
domestic law—including laws relevant to bio-
medical enhancement—may demand immediate 
attention, with potential humanitarian concerns or 
the possibility of requiring serious sanctions. We 
therefore adopt the approach of focusing first on 
legal problems that are generated or exacerbated 
by military human enhancement.
However, the discussion does not end there. 
We also sketch a range of other considerations, 
both explicitly philosophical in nature, as well 
as some affecting more operational concerns. 
While certain of these latter considerations are 
not as likely to lead to direct physical harm to 
subjects and may seem somewhat abstract, these 
matters remain of great importance to the moral 
foundations of military service and the relationship 
between citizens, states, and their military institu-
tions. Also, even though all of these considerations 
are in some sense intertwined, we separate them 
here as best as we can for ease of presentation 
and comprehension.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
What are the provisions in international law that 
may bear upon military human enhancements? 
Should enhancement technologies, which typically 
do not directly interact with anyone other than 
the human subject, nevertheless be subjected to 
a weapons legal review? That is, is there a sense 
in which enhancements could be considered as 
“weapons” and therefore subject to legal instru-
ments such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention? How do norms related to human-
subject research and medical ethics impact military 
enhancements?
These are some of the most important ques-
tions for military enhancements as they relate to 
international law (Lin, 2012a). Conceptually, we 
divide international law into two categories: the 
first is commonly known as the Law of Armed 
Conflict (LOAC) and the second is composed of 
international agreements related to biomedical 
research. Because these are well-known conven-
tions, we will only list them here and add more 
detail later as needed.
Under international humanitarian law (IHL), 
the main instruments of interest here are:
• Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907).
• Geneva Conventions (1949 and Additional 
Protocols I, II, and III).
• Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
(1972).
• Chemical Weapons Convention (1993).
• Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (1998).
Under international biomedical laws—which 
we discuss more in the next section—the main 
instruments of interest here are:
• Nuremberg Code (1947).
• Declaration of Geneva (1948).
• Declaration of Helsinki (1964).
As it concerns new technologies, Article 36 
of the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol 
I, specifies that: “in the study, development, 
acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means 
or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party 
is under an obligation to determine whether its 
employment would, in some or all circumstances, 
be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other 
rule of international law applicable to the High 
Contracting Party” (1977).
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But does Article 36 apply to human enhance-
ment technologies? That is, should they be con-
sidered as a “weapon” or “means or method of 
warfare” in the first place? Unlike other weapons 
contemplated by the LOAC, enhancements usually 
do not directly harm others, so it is not obvious that 
Article 36 of Additional Protocol I would apply 
here. If anyone’s safety were immediately at risk, it 
would seem to be that of the individual warfighter, 
thereby turning the debate into one about bioeth-
ics. To that extent, warfighters, whether enhanced 
or not, are not weapons as typically understood.
Yet in a broader sense, the warfighter is not 
only a weapon but also perhaps a military’s best 
and oldest weapon. Warfighters carry out missions, 
they sometimes kill enemies, and they represent 
one of the largest expenditures or investments 
of a military. They have cognitive and physical 
capabilities that no other technology currently 
has, and this can make them ethical, lethal, and 
versatile. The human fighter, engaged in hand-to-
hand combat, would be the last remaining weapon 
when all others have been exhausted. So in this 
basic sense, the warfighter is undeniably a weapon 
or instrument of war.
Still, should Article 36 be interpreted to include 
warfighters themselves as weapons subject to 
regulation? There could be several reasons to think 
so. First, other organisms are plausibly weapons 
subject to an Article 36 review. Throughout history, 
humans have employed animals in the service of 
war, such as dogs, elephants, pigeons, sea lions, 
dolphins, and possibly rhinoceroses (Knights, 
2007; Beckhusen, 2012; US Navy, 2012). Dogs, 
as the most commonly used animal, undergo 
rigorous training, validation, and inspections (US 
Department of the Army, 2005). If a military were 
to field a weaponized rhino in an urban battlefield 
that contains innocent civilians, we would be 
reasonably worried that the war-rhino does not 
comply with Article 36, if rhinos cannot reliably 
discriminate friends from foe, e.g., a rhino may 
target and charge a noncombatant child in violation 
of the principle of distinction. A similar charge 
would apply to autonomous robots in such a general 
environment in which distinction is important, 
as opposed to a “kill box” or area of such fierce 
fighting that all noncombatants could be presumed 
to have fled (Lin, et al., 2008).
If autonomous robots are clearly regulatable 
weapons, then consider the spectrum of cyborgs—
part-human, part-machine—that exists between 
robots and unenhanced humans. Replacing one 
body part, say a human knee, with a robotic part 
starts us on the cybernetic path. And as other 
body parts are replaced, the organism becomes 
less human and more robotic. Finally, after (hy-
pothetically) replacing every body part, including 
the brain, the organism is entirely robotic with no 
trace of the original human. If we want to say that 
robots are weapons but humans are not, then we 
would be challenged to identify the point on that 
spectrum at which the human becomes a robot or 
a weapon. The inability to draw such a line may 
not be a fatal blow to the claim that humans should 
be treated as weapons; after all, we cannot draw a 
precise line at which a man who is losing his hair 
becomes “bald,” yet there is clearly a difference 
between a bald man and one who has a head full 
of hair (Stanford, 2011). But a simpler solution 
may be to say that humans are weapons, especially 
given the reasons offered previously.
As it applies to military enhancements, inte-
grated robotics may be one form of enhancement, 
but we can also consider scenarios involving bio-
medical enhancements such as pharmaceuticals 
and genetic engineering. Again, on one end of 
the spectrum would stand a normal, unenhanced 
human. One step toward the path of being fully 
enhanced may be a warfighter who drinks coffee 
or pops amphetamines (“go pills”) as a cogni-
tive stimulant or enhancer. Another step may be 
taking drugs that increase strength, erase fear, or 
eliminate the need for sleep. At the more radical 
end may be a warfighter so enhanced that s/he no 
longer resembles a human being, such as a creature 
with four muscular arms, fangs, fur, and other 
animal-like features, and with no moral sense of 
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distinguishing combatant from noncombatant. If a 
war-rhino should be subject to Article 36, then so 
should this radically enhanced human animal, so 
it would seem. And to avoid the difficult question 
of drawing the line at which the enhanced human 
becomes a weapon, a more intuitive position would 
be that the human animal is a weapon all along, 
at every point in the spectrum, especially given 
the previous reasons that are independent of this 
demarcation problem.
If we agree that enhanced human warfighters 
could conceivably be weapons subject to Article 
36, what are the implications? Historically, new 
weapons and tactics needed to conform to at least 
the following:
• Principle of distinction.
• Principle of proportionality.
• Prohibition on superfluous injury or un-
necessary suffering (SIrUS).
To explain: First, the principle of distinction 
demands that a weapon must be discriminating 
enough to target only combatants and never 
noncombatants (Geneva Additional Protocol I, 
1977; Sassòli, 2003). Biological weapons and 
most anti-personnel landmines, then, are indis-
criminate and therefore illegal in that they cannot 
distinguish whether they are about to infect or 
blow up a small child versus an enemy combat-
ant. Unintended killings of noncombatants—or 
“collateral damage”—may be permissible, but 
not their deliberate targeting; but to the extent 
that biological weapons today target anyone, they 
also target everyone. However, a future biological 
weapon, e.g., a virus that attacks only blue-eyed 
people or a certain DNA signature (Hessel et al., 
2012), may be discriminate and therefore would not 
violate this principle (but it could violate others).
Second, the principle of proportionality de-
mands that the use of a weapon be proportional to 
the military objective, so to keep civilian casual-
ties to a minimum (Geneva Additional Protocol 
I, 1977; Cohen, 2010). For instance, dropping a 
nuclear bomb to kill a hidden sniper would be 
a disproportionate use of force, since other less 
drastic methods could have been used.
Third, the SIrUS principle is related to propor-
tionality in that it requires methods of attack to 
be minimally harmful in rendering a warfighter 
hors de combat or unable to fight (Coupland & 
Herby, 1999). This prohibition has led to the ban 
of such weapons as poison, exploding bullets, 
and blinding lasers, which cause more injury or 
suffering than needed to neutralize a combatant.
However implausible, we can imagine a human 
enhancement that violates these and other provi-
sions—for instance, a hypothetical “berserker” 
drug would likely be illegal if it causes the warf-
ighter to be inhumanely vicious, aggressive, and 
indiscriminate in his attacks, potentially killing 
children. For the moment, we will put aside en-
hancements that are directed at adversaries, such 
as a mood-enhancing gas to pacify a riotous crowd 
and a truth-enhancing serum used in interroga-
tions; the former would be prohibited outright by 
the Chemical Weapons Convention in warfare 
(The Royal Society, 2012), partly because it is 
indiscriminate, and the latter may be prohibited by 
laws against torturing and mistreating prisoners of 
war. The point here is that it is theoretically pos-
sible, even if unlikely, for a human enhancement 
to be in clear violation of IHL.
DOMESTIC LAW
The international law considerations adduced 
above primarily involve what militaries should 
(not) do with their enhanced warfighters, but 
there remains a prior question of whether mili-
taries are permitted to enhance their personnel 
at all. Traditionally, this has been a question for 
bioethics and related domestic law, rather than for 
IHL. Hence, we will briefly outline some key US 
domestic laws and regulations that would apply 
to military enhancements.
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Does US domestic law allow the military to 
require enhancements for its own personnel? To 
answer that question, we look at actual legal cases 
in the US that are closely related to, if not directly 
about, questions about human enhancements. 
While we had excluded vaccinations as a type of 
human enhancement in the definitional section of 
the previous chapter— because they are designed 
to sustain health, not provide capabilities beyond 
it—we also acknowledged that this understanding 
was contentious: in a sense, a vaccination seems 
to be an enhancement of the immune system, es-
pecially considering that the patient is not sick at 
the time of the immunization. At the least, even if 
not enhancements themselves, vaccination policy 
can inform a study on how US law might deal 
with military enhancements.
The us military has been vaccinating troops 
since 1777 (Gabriel, 2013). There are currently 
thirteen vaccinations used by the military man-
dated for trainees alone: mandatory vaccinations 
include influenza, hepatitis a and b, measles, po-
liovirus, rubella, and yellow fever, among others 
(Grabenstein, 2006). The standard military policy 
for the mandatory administration of pharmaceu-
tical agents is the same as the policy applied to 
civilians (Russo, 2007): pharmaceuticals need to 
be approved by the us food and drug administra-
tion (FDA) for their intended use before they are 
mandatorily administered; and absent FDA ap-
proval, a presidential waiver or informed voluntary 
consent must be obtained for the administration 
of an investigational drug (IND) (Russo, 2007). 
The US Supreme Court has held that mandatory 
vaccinations of FDA-approved drugs do not violate 
the US Constitution (Jacobson v. Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts, 1905). Mandatory vaccination 
programs in the military have been challenged in 
court (United States v. Chadwell, 1965), but they 
were rarely subjected to substantial legal chal-
lenges until 2001, directed at the anthrax vaccine 
immunization program (AVIP).
Federal Law
As an important catalyst for us law related to 
vaccinations, AVIP—established in 1997—had 
roots in operation desert shield in 1990, at which 
time the US military worried about biological 
and chemical weapons that Saddam Hussein was 
rumored to have possessed. At the time, the DOD 
argued that the informed consent requirement 
for the administration of INDs was impractical 
(Doe v. Sullivan, 1991). The requirement was 
feasible during peacetime, but the DOD urged 
that it posed significant obstacles to the safety of 
troops and mission accomplishment in wartime 
(Brown, 2006). In response to pressure from the 
DOD, the FDA promulgated rule 23(d), otherwise 
known as the interim final rule:
• 21 CFR 50.23(d), or Interim Final Rule.
Rule 23(d) allows the DOD to waive the informed 
consent requirement, if it is not feasible to obtain 
consent in a particular military operation, subject 
to conditions (Brown, 2006). Most importantly, 
the waiver must be limited to “a specific military 
operation involving combat or the immediate 
threat of combat” (Doe v. Sullivan, 1991). Upon 
receiving the request for waiver from the DOD, the 
FDA must evaluate it and grant the waiver “only 
when withholding treatment would be contrary to 
the best interests of military personnel and there 
is no available satisfactory alternative therapy” 
(doe v. Sullivan, 1991). This rule was challenged in 
1991, in doe v. Sullivan, but the federal court held 
that 23(d) was constitutional and within the scope 
of the FDA’s authority (Doe v. Sullivan, 1991).
• 10 USC §1107(f).
In 1998, in response to the ruling in Doe v. Sullivan, 
the US Congress enacted 1107(f). This statutory 
provision requires the DoD to obtain informed 
consent from soldiers before administering an 
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IND (including an approved drug for an unap-
proved use) and provides that the President can 
waive said requirement (10 USCA § 1107 (West)).
• Executive Order 13139.
President Clinton unified both rule 23(d) and 
1107(f) in 1999 with executive order 13139, a 
guideline for waiving informed consent within 
the context of military operations (brown, 2006). 
According to the order, to use an “investigational 
drug” or a “drug unapproved for its intended use,” 
the Secretary of Defense must obtain informed 
consent from each individual service member 
(executive order no. 13139 1999). However, a 
presidential waiver can overcome this require-
ment, but it can only be obtained upon a written 
determination that obtaining consent is: (1) not 
feasible; (2) contrary to the best interests of the 
member; or (3) is not in the interests of national 
security (executive order no. 13139 1999).
• DoDD 6200.2.
The department of defense directive (DODD) 
6200.2, like executive order 13139, synthesized 
several sources of authority governing the use 
of INDs for military health protection (US Dept. 
of Defense, 2012). It defines an IND as a “drug 
not approved or a biological product not licensed 
by the FDA,” or alternatively, as a “drug unap-
proved for its applied use” (US Dept. of Defense, 
2012). Further, it provides that the DOD must 
prefer products approved by the FDA for use as 
countermeasures to INDs (US Dept. of Defense, 
2012). However, “when, at the time of the need 
for a force health care protection counter-measure 
against a particular threat, no safe and effective 
FDA-approved drug or biological product is avail-
able, DOD components may request approval of 
the secretary of defense to use an investigational 
new drug” (US Dept. of Defense, 2012). If the 
secretary of defense determines that obtaining 
informed consent is not feasible, contrary to 
the best interests of the member, and is not in 
the interests of national security, s/he can then 
request a waiver from the president (US Dept. of 
Defense, 2012).
Military Law
Military law operates in conjunction with federal 
civil law, but it focuses on matters germane to the 
military alone. In addition to the constitution, us 
military law is governed by the uniform code of 
military justice (UCMJ). In the context of military 
vaccinations, the issue is about the lawfulness of 
the order to take the vaccination. The DOD’s suc-
cessful defense strategy of the legality of the AVIP 
throughout the anthrax cases was straightforward 
on this account: the vaccine was determined by 
the FDA to be safe and effective for use against 
inhalation anthrax, and under military law the 
legality of an order to take the vaccine was a ques-
tion of law for a judge to decide, not a question 
of fact for determination by a jury (Katz, 2001).
Under the UCMJ, disobedience of a direct and 
lawful order from a superior officer is punishable 
under articles 90 or 92. Article 90 prohibits will-
fully disobeying a superior commissioned officer 
(10 USC § 890 (1994) (UCMJ art. 90)), and article 
92 prohibits failing to obey an order or regulation 
(10 USC § 890 (1994) (UCMJ art. 92)). A soldier 
who refused to take the anthrax vaccination was 
court-martialed, where the DOD would file two 
interlocutory motions: (1) that the lawfulness of 
the order should be decided as a question of law; 
and (2) that all the evidence regarding the safety, 
efficacy, and necessity of the vaccine should be 
excluded because the legal authority of an order is 
not based on the safety of the vaccine (ponder v. 
Stone 2000). The DOD did this in every challenge 
to the AVIP, and in every challenge to the AVIP in 
military court they were successful (Katz, 2001).
A strong, but rebuttable, presumption is that a 
military order is lawful when someone is charged 
with willful disobedience of a lawful order (US 
government, manual for court-martial, 2010; Katz, 
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2001), and the lawfulness of a military order is an 
interlocutory order to be decided on by a judge, not 
a jury (us v. New, 1999; Perry v. Wesely, 2000). 
What this effectively does is foreclose a legal 
challenge to the scientific efficacy of a vaccine 
on procedural grounds. Again, while these legal 
issues were involved with actual cases involving 
vaccinations, we can plausibly extend them to 
anticipate how they would address technologies 
and procedures that are more clearly human en-
hancement than therapy.
OPERATIONS
Beyond the demands of international and domes-
tic law, military enhancements will likely have 
important policy implications. We will examine 
here some of those implications on military opera-
tions themselves. Cognitive and physical human 
enhancements can significantly help a military 
achieve its missions, operate more efficiently 
and perhaps ethically, as well as a host of other 
benefits. But our focus here will be on unintended 
problems that may be caused by enhancements.
Assuming that enhancements are not adopted 
by all warfighters at once—for instance, they are 
rolled out selectively or slowly for safety, eco-
nomic, or other reasons—there would instantly be 
an inequality among the ranks, creating problems 
for unit cohesion. Some warfighters will be privi-
leged (or unlucky?) enough to be appropriately 
enhanced for their mission, whereas some others 
may be underenhanced, while others yet will 
remain “normal.” In broader society, we see that 
uneven access to technology creates a gap between 
the haves and the have-nots, such as the Internet 
divide (Rozner 1998); and this translates into a 
difference in quality of life, education, earnings, 
and so on. It is therefore not unreasonable to expect 
a similar effect within the military.
At the unit level, enhancements may cause (or 
increase) dissension between warfighters. A mix 
of enhanced and unenhanced warfighters within a 
single unit may affect morale and unit cohesion. 
To be sure, similar worries had been voiced re-
lated to the integration of different ethnic groups, 
religions, and sexual orientation in the military 
(Canaday, 2001); but where these differences do 
not intrinsically imply different levels of capabili-
ties or merit that would matter operationally, hu-
man enhancements do. By definition, an enhanced 
warfighter would be stronger, faster, or otherwise 
better enabled than their normal counterparts. 
This means they could accept riskier roles and 
have lower support requirements, for instance.
Further, because enhanced warfighters rep-
resent a significant investment of research and 
effort, they may be treated quite differently from 
‘normal’ warfighters, e.g., perhaps they will not 
be subjected to the hard work of routine fighting 
or other “mundane” uses. For comparison, many 
Allied airborne troops in World War II were pulled 
from the lines after the D-Day invasion of Nor-
mandy, rather than being required to slog through 
France and the Hürtgen Forest in Germany. The 
asymmetry of needs and capabilities could cause 
resentment of the unenhanced or underenhanced 
as a drag on capabilities and operational efficiency 
of the enhanced, as well as resentment by the 
others of the superior abilities and (likely) supe-
rior status of the enhanced. To some extent, we 
already witness this when militaries switch their 
dependence from soldiers to “special operators” 
such as Navy SEALs. The asymmetry could also 
create a sense of entitlement among the enhanced 
and undermine an esprit de corps, much as some 
superstars do on sports teams.
Morale is also relevant to confidence in com-
mand. Enhancements could create novel dif-
ficulties for the command structure, particularly 
if commanders were unenhanced and were seen 
as physically—or, worse, intellectually—inferior 
to those they command. To take one firsthand 
perspective, retired US Army Brigadier General 
Richard O’Meara asserts that a social contract 
exists between troops and leaders, one that places 
the burden of defining the goals of a mission on 
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the leaders, and the burden of accomplishment on 
the troops (O’Meara, 2012). But while the troops 
have the responsibility to accomplish the goals 
that command has set forth, they also have a right 
to demand that leaders make informed decisions, 
even if difficult ones, and to do so in a way that 
warfighters recognize as legitimate. It is a recipe 
for disaster when those further down the chain of 
command are continually second-guessing and 
evading their orders. If human enhancement exac-
erbates that lack of confidence in leaders, it could 
undermine the strategy and tactics of command.
Physical enhancements may be less problem-
atic in this regard than cognitive ones, at least 
with respect to challenges to command. When the 
troops are generally less educated, less interested 
in strategy, and more concerned with communal 
rather than individual rights and values, command 
can worry less about the potential disobedience 
that could result from enhancements. Generally 
speaking, the primary responsibility of typical 
enlisted soldiers is to know at all times what their 
superiors desire of them; their well being, even 
their survival, may well depend on it. Therefore, 
the rank-and-file are typically extremely sensi-
tive to the wishes of command and, even when 
those wishes are not officially communicated, 
there is an expectation that a soldier will “get 
it” and learn to read the signs and comply, or 
disregard at their peril. Further, military culture 
is based on the assumption that the decisions of 
leadership are entitled to greater weight based 
on superior knowledge and judgment. Diffusing 
the power to make decisions strikes at the heart 
of the legitimacy of leadership; and so cognitive 
enhancements pose dangers to received military 
models that mere physical enhancements do not.
There are further implications for service, 
pay, and conditions. Perhaps we should think 
about enhanced warfighters as we do with other 
specially trained operators, such as the Army’s 
Special Forces or Navy SEALs. That is, military 
policy could be to keep the enhanced separated 
from the unenhanced, in special or elite units; this 
would reduce any friction between the two groups. 
However, this segregation may merely telescope 
the problem out to a broader level, shifting ten-
sion from within units to among different units: 
if special units are given access to enhancements, 
or otherwise treated or rewarded differently—as-
suming we can even think of enhancements as 
rewards—then other units may feel slighted.
But as we alluded to above, it may be an open 
question of whether a particular enhancement 
may be a benefit to the individual. Leaving dis-
enhancements aside, some or many enhancements 
pose side-effect risks; for instance, we still do not 
adequately understand the role of sleep and long-
term effects of sleep deprivation, even if we can 
engineer a warfighter to operate on very little or no 
(true) sleep, as some animals are already capable 
of doing. So depending on one’s perspective, an 
enhancement could be a reward or benefit, or it 
could be an undesired risk, as some believed about 
anthrax vaccinations (Wasserman & Grabenstein, 
2003; Berkelman, Halsey, & Resnik, 2012).
How, then, should enhancements affect the 
service commitment of military personnel? In-
sofar as an enhancement is costly to develop and 
represents an investment, it may be reasonable 
to expect the enhanced warfighter to commit to 
longer service. But if an enhancement is seen more 
as a mere risk, then perhaps a shorter length of 
service is appropriate for the enhanced. Similar 
decisions may need to be made with respect to 
pay, promotions, and so on. For instance, if promo-
tions and “danger pay” may be used to incentiv-
ize volunteers, enhanced soldiers could be better 
positioned and more likely to accept dangerous 
missions in exchange for those benefits.
On the mission side of operations, human 
enhancements may elicit a backlash that hinders 
the mission and therefore detracts from the value 
of enhancements for the military. This kind of 
blowback is already seen with the US govern-
ment’s use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 
in the so-called “drone wars”: While the US views 
its target strikes as appropriate—if not ethically 
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required—to the extent that it is taking American 
military personnel out of harm’s way in a presum-
ably just campaign, adversaries often see drones 
as an unfair, cowardly, and dishonorable proxy 
for a military afraid to engage face-to-face with 
human resistance (Galliott, forthcoming). This 
sentiment seems to fuel resentment and hatred 
toward the US, which in turn may help to recruit 
more terrorists (Foust, 2012; Plaw, 2012).
Similarly, if adversaries regard military en-
hancements as unfair, cowardly or abominable, 
they may be counterproductive to the larger war 
effort and perhaps encourage the enemy to resort 
to more conventional but very much despicable 
means (Galliott, 2012a). This is not to say that war 
should be a “fair fight.” Indeed, the whole idea of 
employing emerging technologies is to leverage 
force and confer some military advantage. How-
ever, as with drone strikes, states must carefully 
think about the consequences of enhancing soldiers 
in terms of possible retaliatory options, and such 
considerations may preclude the employment of 
such means in the first instance (Galliott, 2012b).
Another criticism of the drone wars that may 
be applied to military enhancements is the charge 
that these technologies, by better ensuring the sur-
vival and success of our own military personnel, 
serve to make war more risk-free and therefore 
a more palatable option (Lin, Abney, & Bekey, 
2008; Lin, 2010; Lin, 2011; Galliott, forthcom-
ing; Human Rights Watch, 2012). That is, we 
may be tempted into choosing a military option 
during a political conflict, rather than saving war 
as the last resort as demanded by traditional just 
war theory. This ethical imperative is reflected in 
Civil War General Robert E. Lee’s observation: 
“It is well that war is so terrible; otherwise, we 
would grow too fond of it” (Cooke, 1876, p. 184; 
Levin, 2008). As war becomes less terrible—at 
least for our own side—our natural aversions to 
it may be lessened as well.
This criticism leads to other related charges 
such as that drones are making it easier to wage 
war secretly, thus subverting democratic require-
ments, e.g., any due process afforded to targets 
that are US citizens and the War Powers Resolu-
tion of 1973 (50 USC §1541-1548). To the extent 
that enhancements can make it easier for military 
teams to covertly conduct missions and penetrate 
enemy lines, it would likewise be easier to con-
duct illegal operations, such as assassinations and 
cross-border attacks without the permission of the 
receiving nation-state.
ETHICS
In the above two sections, we have identified the 
key challenges that military human enhancement 
may pose to law, operations, and related policy. 
In this final section, we briefly discuss a range 
of other implications that fall broadly under the 
banner of “ethics.”
Character and Virtue
In recent decades, virtue ethics has enjoyed a broad 
resurgence of interest by scholars, applying the 
Aristotelian moral framework to environmental 
ethics, business ethics, bioethics, medical, and 
legal ethics (Oakley & Cocking, 2001; Sandler & 
Cafaro, 2005; Walker & Ivanhoe, 2007). Virtue 
ethics is often thought of as uniquely suitable for 
professional ethics, so given that the military is 
one of the professions, it should not surprise us 
that virtue ethics has been recognized as having 
core applications here as well. Indeed, virtue ethics 
has arguably been an integral component of think-
ing about military ethics for millennia, insofar as 
reference to virtues (e.g., courage, honor, loyalty, 
and justice) is an enduring feature of ethical dis-
course in the military tradition (Olsthoorn, 2010).
Virtue ethical frameworks are also being ap-
plied to the unique ethical challenges presented by 
emerging military technologies, such as autono-
mous robots and drones (Lin, Abney, & Bekey, 
2012; Enemark, 2013). We can extend that trend 
to consider the ethical implications that military 
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enhancements may have with respect to the moral 
virtues. First, let us briefly clarify what we mean 
by “virtues” in the ethical context that concerns 
us here. In most ethical theories in which virtues 
play a central role, moral virtues are understood 
to be states of a person’s character, which we have 
already said are stable dispositions that promote 
that person’s reliable performance of right or 
excellent actions. Such actions, when the result 
of genuine virtue, imply the praiseworthiness of 
the person performing them. In human beings, 
virtues of character are not gifts of birth or passive 
circumstance; they are cultivated states that lead 
to a person’s deliberate and reasoned choice of the 
good. They result from habitual and committed 
practice and study of right actions, and they imply 
an alignment of the agent’s feelings, beliefs, desires 
and perceptions in ways that are consistently found 
to be appropriate to the various practical contexts 
in which the person is called to act.
Thus, virtues of character are conceived as 
personal “excellences” in their own right; their 
value is not exhausted in the good actions they 
promote. When properly integrated, individual 
virtues contribute to a moral agent’s possession 
of “virtue” writ large; that is, they motivate us to 
describe a person as virtuous, rather than merely 
noting their embodiment of a particular virtue such 
as courage, honesty or justice. States of a person’s 
character contrary to virtue are characterized as 
vices, and a person whose character is dominated 
by vice is therefore appropriately characterized 
as vicious.
A virtuous person is conceived as good, they 
are also understood to be moving toward the ac-
complishment of a good, flourishing or excellent 
life; that is, they are living well. While the cultiva-
tion of virtue does not aim at securing the agent’s 
own flourishing independently of the flourishing 
of others (it is not egoistic in this sense), the 
successful cultivation of a virtuous character is 
conceptually inseparable from the possibility of 
a good life for the agent. Yet the way this good 
is achieved in action cannot be fixed by a set of 
advance rules or principles, but must be continu-
ally discerned by the agent herself in a manner 
that is adapted to the particular practical contexts 
and roles she occupies. This contextual element 
sets virtue ethics clearly apart from utilitarian 
and deontological frameworks, and it explains 
why virtue ethics is so useful for application to 
the military profession.
Virtue ethics presupposes that the appropri-
ate actions of a courageous soldier in battle, for 
example, will be very different from those of a 
courageous teacher or courageous politician, and 
from how the soldier displays courage at home in 
civilian life. The virtuous agent is “prudentially 
wise,” meaning that she is able to readily see what 
moral responses different situations call for, and 
she can adapt her conduct accordingly in a way 
that nevertheless reflects her unified character as 
a virtuous individual. What, then, are the implica-
tions of military enhancements for the ability of 
warfighters to cultivate and express virtue? What 
follows does not exhaust the topics of potential 
concern about military enhancement and virtue, 
but merely an overview of the issues that are likely 
to matter most from a virtue-ethical standpoint.
We should start by questioning what counts 
as a “virtuous” enhancement. Many proposed 
enhancements might be viewed as ways to directly 
enhance military virtue itself. For example, if a 
pill, subdermal implant, or genetic alteration can 
make warfighters more willing to expose them-
selves to risk of harm, doesn’t the enhancement 
make them more courageous? Yet this is too simple 
an analysis. From the moral standpoint, a trait or 
disposition is not a virtue just because it happens 
to result in appropriate actions. Virtuous actions 
must also emanate from the person’s own moral 
viewpoint, that is, from his or her way of seeing 
and judging the ethical and practical implications 
of a situation. Otherwise the actions, however 
desirable from an institutional point of view, are 
not creditable to the moral character and wisdom 
of the agent. Thus if virtue and character matter 
in military ethics (note this assumes that we have 
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gone beyond narrowly utilitarian considerations, 
such as risk-benefit calculations), then it very 
much matters how an enhancement modifies 
warfighters, not just how it affects their behavior.
For example, a pill that suppresses common 
physiologically-rooted panic reactions in battle 
looks compatible with virtue, if those reactions 
would otherwise undermine the soldier’s train-
ing, expertise and rational grasp of the situation. 
Consider a soldier who successfully cultivates 
the thoughts, desires and feelings that are fitting 
for an excellent soldier in battle, but whose ac-
tions in the field are still hampered by autonomic 
symptoms of alarm beyond his or her control (e.g., 
shortness of breath, dangerously elevated pulse). 
Such a person could be aided in courage by an 
enhancement that short-circuits those symptoms.
Yet if the enhancement leads a soldier to act in 
ways that contradict a cognitive grasp of what’s 
appropriate (e.g., “I knew it was too risky to engage 
that truck convoy without better reconnaissance, 
but for some reason I just did it anyway”), then the 
enhancement is actually an impediment to cour-
age, in this case promoting the contrary vice of 
rashness. Alternatively, if the enhancement elicits 
apparently courageous actions from a soldier who 
continues to have seriously inappropriate feel-
ings, attitudes, and judgments about battlefield 
risk, we would not say that the outcome of the 
enhancement is a courageous or “good” soldier; 
we have merely boosted the utility of a bad one. 
Enhancements of this sort would be problematic 
not only in particular cases, but also because they 
could interfere more generally with the ethical 
habituation of virtuous soldiers, who become 
prudentially wise actors only by habitually learning 
to see situations correctly and develop appropriate 
responses and strategies for dealing with them. If 
enhancements come to be used as a substitute for 
that learning process, they will actually hinder 
the cultivation of prudent, courageous and good 
soldiers, according to virtue ethics.
The issue of reversibility of enhancements is 
relevant here too. Since virtue presupposes the 
cognitive or affective flexibility to adapt behavior 
to circumstance and social context, an enhance-
ment that “set” an agent’s behavior patterns in a 
certain mode, or otherwise made his or her reac-
tion patterns less adaptable (e.g., to civilian life 
or peacetime operations) would inhibit the ability 
to function virtuously and, by extension, to lead 
a good life. Even temporary enhancements could 
introduce this problem if they prevent the soldier 
from adapting well to the emerging exigencies of 
battle. A virtuous soldier is one who can imme-
diately “dial down” the targeted desire to kill the 
enemy when a crowd of children unpredictably 
enters the field of action.
Virtue ethics also requires us to consider the 
potential impact of enhancements on moral leader-
ship in military life. Most virtue ethicists acknowl-
edge that fully virtuous agents who cultivate and 
display moral wisdom in all of their professional 
and personal roles are usually a significant minor-
ity in any population: it’s not easy to be virtuous. 
Therefore, one of the most important social and 
professional functions of the virtuous person is to 
serve as a moral example to which others aspire 
and strive to emulate. In the context of military 
life, this function is largely imputed to the officer 
corps. Enlisted soldiers are certainly recognized 
for exemplary acts of courage and valor, but as 
in any profession, complete military virtue is 
thought to require not only fine actions but also 
much experience, as well as mature reflection upon 
the goals and ideals of the profession—something 
officer training can provide.
This invites a novel set of ethical questions 
about enhancements, some recurring throughout 
this report: Will they be given to officers, or just 
combat soldiers? Will they erect a moral divide 
between the military ranks? Who will have greater 
“moral authority” and status as ethical exemplars: 
enhanced or unenhanced military personnel? 
How will enhancement impact the process of 
military education? Would an unenhanced offi-
cer’s lessons on cultivating courage or fortitude 
over a lifetime of service be relevant to a soldier 
artificially enhanced for these qualities? There are 
also important questions about how enhancement 
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might affect perceptions of military character by 
civilians and by unenhanced forces abroad; for 
example, will enhanced soldiers encounter less 
goodwill or greater resistance from those who see 
their status as antithetical to traditional ideals of 
military virtue and character?
Finally, ethical concerns with military enhance-
ment do not end with the question of what it means 
to be a good soldier; they extend to what it means 
to be a good human being. There is a debate among 
virtue ethicists about whether virtue is rooted in 
a distinctive conception of what, if anything, a 
human should naturally be. Aristotle certainly 
thought so, but some modern virtue ethicists deny 
this (Swanton 2003; Slote 2011). Still, most virtue 
ethicists believe that what is ethical for a human 
is inseparable from what is appropriate to human 
development on the whole. If they are right, then 
enhancements that take us too far from what is 
distinctively human are morally problematic in 
their own right. That said, enhancements that 
introduce non-natural physiology like the ability 
to eat grass or forgo sleep would be of far less 
concern to a virtue ethicist than enhancements 
that warp the distinctive moral, emotional and 
intellectual capacities that underpin virtue of 
character. For example, a pill or neural implant 
that disrupted or diminished a soldier’s overall 
capacity to experience grief, guilt, compassion, 
curiosity, creativity, critical reflection or love 
would be highly problematic from a virtue-ethical 
standpoint (Nussbaum, 2011).
Emotion and Honour
Related to the issue of military virtues and profes-
sionalism is the question of what role emotions 
and honor, or codes of ethics, play in warfighters. 
With human enhancements, military organiza-
tions may elevate or diminish emotions and other 
psychological dispositions in their operators for 
some immediate benefit, but we also need to 
consider broader effects. Questions in this area 
include: does participation in any war, regard-
less of whether one’s own side of the conflict’s 
participation fulfills just war theory criteria, dam-
ages one’s humanity? What does killing do to the 
psychological, spiritual, and emotional health of 
the warrior? What effect would human enhance-
ments have with respect to that health?
Some scholars and clinicians assert that any 
violence against another human being causes the 
perpetrator psychological damage, even if the 
actions were taken undeniably in self-defense. 
Rachel MacNair, clinical psychologist and author 
of Perpetration-Induced Traumatic Stress: The 
Psychological Consequences of Killing, describes 
the dangers of taking another human life:
All of these things—anxiety, panic, depression, 
substance abuse—can also be included in the 
‘psychological consequences’ of killing, along 
with such things as increased paranoia or a sense 
of disintegration, or dissociation or amnesia at 
the time of the trauma itself. In the case of kill-
ing, feelings of guilt can vary widely, from killing 
that is not socially approved, such as criminal 
homicide, to killing that is not only approved but 
also expected, such as soldiers in war. People can 
feel guilty even under circumstances that involve 
clear self-defense.... [S]evere PTSD can be suf-
fered without any feelings of guilt at all, and guilt 
can be suffered without any symptoms of PTSD 
(MacNair, 2002).
The warfighters’ code of honor plays a key role 
in preserving their mental health, in addition to 
preventing atrocities. As French explains in The 
Code of the Warrior (French, 2003): Murder is 
a good example of an act that is cross-culturally 
condemned. Whatever their other points of dis-
cord, the major religions of the world agree in 
the determination that murder (variously defined) 
is wrong. Unfortunately, the fact that we abhor 
murder produces a disturbing tension for those 
who are asked to fight wars for their tribes, clans, 
communities, cultures or nations. When they are 
trained for war, warriors are given a mandate by 
their society to take lives. But they must learn to 
take only certain lives in certain ways, at certain 
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times, and for certain reasons. Otherwise, they 
become indistinguishable from murderers and will 
find themselves condemned by the very societies 
they were created to serve.
Warrior cultures throughout history and from 
diverse regions around the globe have constructed 
codes of behavior, based on that culture’s image 
of the ideal warrior. These codes have not always 
been written down or literally codified into a set 
of explicit rules. A code can be hidden in the lines 
of epic poems or implied by the descriptions of 
mythic heroes. One way or another, it is carefully 
conveyed to each succeeding generation of war-
riors. These codes tend to be quite demanding. 
They are often closely linked to a culture’s reli-
gious beliefs and can be connected to elaborate 
(and frequently death defying or excruciatingly 
painful) rituals and rites of passage.
In many cases this code of honor seems to hold 
the warrior to a higher ethical standard than that 
required for an ordinary citizen within the general 
population of the society the warrior serves. The 
code is not imposed from the outside. The war-
riors themselves police strict adherence to these 
standards; with violators being shamed, ostracized, 
or even killed by their peers.
The code of the warrior not only defines how 
he should interact with his own warrior comrades, 
but also how he should treat other members of his 
society, his enemies, and the people he conquers. 
The code restrains the warrior. It sets boundaries 
on his behavior. It distinguishes honorable acts 
from shameful acts.
But why do warriors need a code that ties 
their hands and limits their options? Why should 
a warrior culture want to restrict the actions of 
its members and require them to commit to lofty 
ideals? Might not such restraints cripple their 
effectiveness as warriors? What’s wrong with, 
“All’s fair in love and war?” Isn’t winning all that 
matters? Are concerns about honor and shame 
burdens to the warrior? And, again, what is the 
interplay between cognitive enhancements and 
this code of honor?
One reason for such warriors’ codes may be to 
protect the warrior himself (or herself) from seri-
ous psychological damage. To say the least, the 
things that warriors are asked to do to guarantee 
their cultures’ survival are far from pleasant. Even 
those few who, for whatever reason, seem to feel 
no revulsion at spilling another human being’s guts 
on the ground, severing a limb, slicing off a head, 
or burning away a face are likely to be affected by 
the sight of their friends or kinsmen suffering the 
same fate. The combination of the warriors’ own 
natural disgust at what they must witness in battle 
and the fact that what they must do to endure and 
conquer can seem so uncivilized, so against what 
they have been taught by their society, creates the 
conditions for even the most accomplished war-
riors to feel tremendous self-loathing.
In the introduction to his valuable analysis of 
Vietnam veterans suffering from post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD), Achilles in Vietnam: 
Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character, 
psychiatrist and author Jonathan Shay stresses 
the importance of “understanding...the specific 
nature of catastrophic war experiences that not 
only cause lifelong disabling psychiatric symptoms 
but can ruin good character” (Shay, 1994). Shay 
has conducted countless personal interviews and 
therapy sessions with American combat veterans 
who are part of the Veterans Improvement Program 
(VIP). His work has led him to the conclusion that 
the most severe cases of PTSD are the result of 
wartime experiences that are not simply violent, 
but which involve what Shay terms the “betrayal 
of ‘what’s right’” (Shay, 1994). Veterans who 
believe that they were directly or indirectly party 
to immoral or dishonorable behavior (perpetrated 
by themselves, their comrades, or their command-
ers) have the hardest time reclaiming their lives 
after the war is over. Such men may be tortured by 
persistent nightmares, may have trouble discern-
ing a safe environment from a threatening one, 
may not be able to trust their friends, neighbors, 
family members, or government, and many have 
problems with alcohol, drugs, child or spousal 
152
Super Soldiers (Part 2)
 
abuse, depression, and suicidal tendencies. As 
Shay sorrowfully concludes, “The painful paradox 
is that fighting for one’s country can render one 
unfit to be its citizen” (Shay, 1994).
Warriors need a way to distinguish what they 
must do out of a sense of duty from what a serial 
killer does for the sheer sadistic pleasure of it. Their 
actions, like those of the serial killer, set them 
apart from the rest of society. Warriors, however, 
are not sociopaths. They respect the values of 
the society in which they were raised and which 
they are prepared to die to protect. Therefore, it is 
important for them to conduct themselves in such 
a way that they will be honored and esteemed by 
their communities, not reviled and rejected by 
them. They want to be seen as proud defenders 
and representatives of what is best about their 
culture: as heroes, not “baby-killers.”
In a sense, the nature of the warrior’s profes-
sion puts him or her at a higher risk for moral 
corruption than most other occupations because 
it involves exerting power in matters of life and 
death. Warriors exercise the power to take or 
save lives, order others to take or save lives, and 
lead or send others to their deaths. If they take 
this awesome responsibility too lightly—if they 
lose sight of the moral significance of their ac-
tions—they risk losing their humanity and their 
ability to flourish in human society.
In his powerful work, On Killing: The Psy-
chological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and 
Society, Lt. Col. Dave Grossman illuminates the 
process by which those in war and those training 
for war attempt to achieve emotional distance 
from their enemies. The practice of dehuman-
izing the enemy through the use of abusive or 
euphemistic language is a common and effective 
tool for increasing aggression and breaking down 
inhibitions against killing:
It is so much easier to kill someone if they look 
distinctly different than you. If your propaganda 
machine can convince your soldiers that their 
opponents are not really human but are ‘inferior 
forms of life,’ then their natural resistance to kill-
ing their own species will be reduced. Often the 
enemy’s humanity is denied by referring to him 
as a ‘gook,’ ‘Kraut,’ or ‘Nip’ (Grossman, 1996).
Like Shay, Grossman has interviewed many US 
veterans of the Vietnam War. Not all of his subjects, 
however, were those with lingering psychological 
trauma. Grossman found that some of the men he 
interviewed had never truly achieved emotional 
distance from their former foes, and seemed to be 
the better for it. These men expressed admiration 
for Vietnamese culture. Some had even married 
Vietnamese women. They appeared to be leading 
happy and productive post-war lives. In contrast, 
those who persisted in viewing the Vietnamese 
as “less than animals” were unable to leave the 
war behind them.
Grossman writes about the dangers of dehu-
manizing the enemy in terms of potential damage 
to the war effort, long-term political fallout, and 
regional or global instability:
Because of [our] ability to accept other cultures, 
Americans probably committed fewer atrocities 
than most other nations would have under the 
circumstances associated with guerrilla warfare 
in Vietnam. Certainly fewer than was the track 
record of most colonial powers. Yet still we had 
our My Lai, and our efforts in that war were 
profoundly, perhaps fatally, undermined by that 
single incident. It can be easy to unleash this genie 
of racial and ethnic hatred in order to facilitate 
killing in time of war. It can be more difficult to 
keep the cork in the bottle and completely restrain 
it. Once it is out, and the war is over, the genie 
is not easily put back in the bottle. Such hatred 
lingers over the decades, even centuries, as can 
be seen today in Lebanon and what was once 
Yugoslavia (Grossman, 1996).
The insidious harm brought to the individual 
warriors who find themselves swept up by such 
devastating propaganda matters a great deal to 
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those concerned with the warriors’ own welfare. 
In a segment on the “Clinical Importance of 
Honoring or Dishonoring the Enemy,” Jonathan 
Shay describes an intimate connection between 
the psychological health of the veteran and the 
respect he feels for those he fought. He stresses 
how important it is to the warrior to have the 
conviction that he participated in an honorable 
endeavor:
Restoring honor to the enemy is an essential 
step in recovery from combat PTSD. While other 
things are obviously needed as well, the veteran’s 
self-respect never fully recovers so long as he is 
unable to see the enemy as worthy. In the words 
of one of our patients, a war against subhuman 
vermin ‘has no honor.’ This is true even in vic-
tory; in defeat, the dishonoring absence of hu-
man themis (shared values, a common sense of 
‘what’s right’) linking enemy to enemy makes life 
unendurable”(Shay, 1994). 
Shay finds echoes of these sentiments in the 
words of J. Glenn Gray from Gray’s modern 
classic on the experience of war, The Warriors: 
Reflections on Men in Battle. With the struggle 
of the Allies against the Japanese in the Pacific 
Theater of World War II as his backdrop, Gray 
brings home the agony of the warrior who has 
become incapable of honoring his enemies and 
thus is unable to find redemption himself:
The ugliness of a war against an enemy conceived 
to be subhuman can hardly be exaggerated. There 
is an unredeemed quality to battle experienced 
under these conditions, which blunts all senses 
and perceptions. Traditional appeals of war are 
corroded by the demands of a war of extermina-
tion, where conventional rules no longer apply. 
For all its inhumanity, war is a profoundly human 
institution....This image of the enemy as beast 
lessens even the satisfaction in destruction, for 
there is no proper regard for the worth of the object 
destroyed....The joys of comradeship, keenness of 
perception, and sensual delights [are] lessened....
No aesthetic reconciliation with one’s fate as a 
warrior [is] likely because no moral purgation 
[is] possible (Gray, 1998).
By setting standards of behavior for themselves, 
accepting certain restraints, and even “honoring 
their enemies,” warriors can create a lifeline that 
will allow them to pull themselves out of the 
hell of war and reintegrate themselves into their 
society, should they survive to see peace restored. 
A warrior’s code may cover everything from the 
treatment of prisoners of war to oath keeping to 
table etiquette, but its primary purpose is to grant 
nobility to the warriors’ profession. This allows 
warriors to retain both their self-respect and 
the respect of those they guard (French, 2003). 
Cognitive enhancements, then, would operate 
against this complex and subtle background to 
effects that may be psychologically disastrous or 
difficult to predict.
Broader Impacts
From the preceding, we can see that concerns 
about military enhancements can be focused 
inward, toward the health and character of the 
human subject. But these concerns can also ripple 
outward, focused beyond the human subject. 
These issues engage law, policy, and ethics; for 
instance, how do enhancements impact military 
operations, including how adversaries might re-
spond? But since enhancements change the human 
person—the basic unit of society—we can expect 
changes and challenges beyond such first-order and 
second-order effects. These broader impacts are 
temporally more distant and therefore tend to be 
discounted; but they are nevertheless foreseeable 
and should also be considered ahead of rapidly 
advancing science and technology.
First, we can expect the proliferation of perhaps 
every military technology we invent, as history 
shows. For instance, besides WWII-era Jeeps and 
modern-day Humvees returned to society as better-
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polished civilian models, and GPS was directly 
adopted by society without any modification (Lin, 
2010). The method of diffusion would be differ-
ent and more direct with enhancements, though: 
most warfighters return to society as civilians (our 
veterans) and would carry back any permanent 
enhancements and addictions with them. Again, 
the US has about 23 million veterans, or one out 
of every 10 adults, in addition to 3 million active 
and reserve personnel (US Census, 2011), so this 
is a significant segment of the population. Would 
these enhancements—such as a drug or an opera-
tion that subdues emotions—create problems for 
the veteran to assimilate to civilian life? What kinds 
of pressures and how much, including healthcare 
costs, would be placed on the Department of Vet-
eran Affairs, given military enhancements, and 
are we prepared to handle those costs?
Proliferation into society is not limited to 
our own borders, but we can expect it to occur 
internationally, again as history shows. Even 
the military robotics that have been deployed in 
war only within the last decade are not just a US 
phenomenon, as much as it may seem from the 
international media’s focus. It is reported that more 
than 50 nations now have or are developing military 
robotics, including China and Iran (Singer, 2009; 
Sharkey, 2011). Where the US deploys robots for 
their considerable advantages in surveillance, 
strike, and other roles, we would be unprepared 
to receive the same treatment if (and when) it is 
inflicted upon us. With nuclear weapons, while 
the US had the first-mover advantage, proliferation 
pushed us toward non-use agreements and erased 
much of that advantage (International Atomic 
Energy Agency, 1970). Likewise with military 
enhancements (and robotics), we can expect other 
nations to develop or adopt the same technologies 
we develop and therefore, at some point, have the 
same capabilities, again diminishing the competi-
tive benefits once derived from the enhancements.
The wider impact of military enhancements 
echoes those already identified in the rich literature 
on human enhancements generally, for instance: 
would enhanced veterans—say, with bionic limbs 
and augmented cognition—put other civilians at 
a competitive disadvantage with respect to jobs, 
school, sports, and so on? Would this create an 
enhancement arms race beyond steroids, as is now 
starting in sports? If enhanced veterans (and the 
other enhanced people they inspire) live longer 
than usual, does that put undue burdens on social 
security and pension funds? Would these advan-
tages create social pressures to enhance more 
generally, as we are witnessing with Modafinil—a 
cognitive enhancer—in both the classroom and 
the workplace?
Relatedly, would enhanced warfighters be bad 
role models, such as steroid-using athletes, for 
children? We can expect some children will want 
to enhance themselves, and some will succeed. 
But this seems bad insofar as their bodies are still 
developing and anyway don’t have full intellectual 
or legal capacity to make informed life-altering 
decisions (e.g., tattoos). Enhancements, as distinct 
from purely therapeutic uses, would likely not 
have been tested on normal children and other 
populations, such as pregnant women and those 
of advanced age, in that it may be too risky to 
conduct such testing on those healthy individuals, 
relative to the benefits. That is, there would be 
no countervailing benefit of helping to cure the 
individual of an illness, if those subjects were 
normal to begin with.
Earlier, we discussed the issue of access to 
enhancements within the military: who should 
receive them, some warfighters or all; and what 
problems could unequal access create? At a larger 
societal scale, there may be friction between the 
enhanced and unenhanced, or at least a class di-
vide—in terms of education, job outlook, etc.—as 
we already see between those with Internet access 
and those without. If enhancements in society are 
expensive and only afforded by the wealthier, 
then this may widen the gap between the haves 
and the have-nots. Similarly, would there be a 
communication divide between the enhanced and 
unenhanced, if the former can see in different 
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wavelengths and have different powers of percep-
tion? On the other hand, if there’s no moral issue 
generally with enhancing humans, then why not 
uplift animals closer to human-level intelligence 
(Dvorsky, 2012), building on chimera work previ-
ously discussed?
While neither international nor domestic law 
requires that we consider these and other societal 
effects, ethics and public policy do. Without proper 
management, technological disruptions can have 
serious, avoidable effects. Possible solutions, as 
suggested for other issues previously considered, 
may include a policy to implement only revers-
ible or temporary enhancements in the military 
as a firewall for broader society. To be sure, some 
commentators do not view enhancements in the 
general population as a bad or unmanageable 
outcome. So this continuing wider debate on hu-
man enhancements—which we will not explicate 
here, as it is available elsewhere (Allhoff et al., 
2010a)—should be of interest to the military, 
especially as the military is a key driver of new 
technologies that eventually make their way into 
broader society.
CONCLUSION
Human enhancements have the potential to make 
it easier and safer for warfighters to do their job. 
Enhancements have a long history in the military, 
but recent opposition to their use in realms such 
as sports and academia, as well as controversy 
over the off-label or experimental use of certain 
drugs by the military, are forcing questions about 
the appropriateness of their use by the military. 
While military enhancements have largely escaped 
the scrutiny of the public as well as policymakers, 
the science and technologies underwriting human 
enhancements are marching ahead.
The military technology getting the most atten-
tion now is robotics. As we suggested throughout 
the report, there may be ethical, legal, and policy 
parallels between robotics and enhancements, and 
certainly more lessons can be drawn. We can think 
of military robotics as sharing the same goal as 
human enhancement. Robotics may aim to create 
a super soldier from an engineering approach: 
they are our proxy mecha-warriors. However, 
there are some important limitations to those 
machines. For one thing, they don’t have a sense 
of ethics—of what is right and wrong—which 
can be essential on the battlefield and to the laws 
of war. Where it is child’s play to identify a ball 
or coffee mug or a gun, it’s notoriously tough for 
a computer to do that, especially objects that are 
novel or otherwise unlabeled (Le et al., 2012). 
This does not give us much confidence that a 
robot can reliably distinguish friend from foe, at 
least in the foreseeable future.
In contrast, cognitive and physical enhance-
ments aim to create a super-soldier from a biomedi-
cal direction, such as with drugs and bionics. For 
battle, we want our soft organic bodies to perform 
more like machines. Somewhere in between robot-
ics and biomedical research, we might arrive at the 
perfect future warfighter: one that is part machine 
and part human, striking a formidable balance 
between technology and our frailties. Indeed, 
the field of neuromorphic robots already aims to 
fill this gap by using biological brains to control 
robotic bodies (Krichmar & Wagatsuma, 2011).
In changing human biology with enhance-
ments, we also may be changing the assumptions 
behind existing laws of war and even human ethics. 
If so, we would need to reexamine the foundations 
of our social and political institutions—including 
the military—if prevailing norms create “policy 
vacuums” (Moor 2005) in failing to account for 
new technologies (Lin, 2012b; Lin, Allhoff, & 
Rowe, 2012; Taddeo, 2012).
In comic books and science fiction, we can 
suspend disbelief about the details associated 
with fantastical technologies and abilities, as 
represented by human enhancements. But in 
the real world—as life imitates art, and “mutant 
powers” really are changing the world—the de-
tails matter and will require real investigations. 
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The issues discussed in this report are complex, 
given an unfamiliar interplay among technology 
ethics, bioethics, military law, and other relevant 
areas. As such, further studies will require close 
collaborations with a range of disciplines and 
stakeholders, as is increasingly the case in tech-
nology ethics (Brey, 2000). Given the pervasive 
role of national security and defense in the modern 
world in particular, as well as the flow of military 
technologies into civilian society, many of these 
issues are urgent now and need to be actively 
engaged, ideally in advance of or in parallel with 
rapidly emerging science and technologies.
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Disenhancement: A medical or biological 
intervention that makes one worse off.
Miltiary-Technical Proliferation: The spread 
of military technologies into the civilian realm.
Principle of Distinction: An element of inter-
national law and just war theory which demands 
that a weapon must be discriminating enough to 
target only combatants and never noncombatants.
Principle of Proportionality: Demands that 
the use of a weapon be proportional to the mili-
tary objective, so as to keep civilian casualties 
to a minimum.
SIrUS Principle: Related to proportionality in 
that it requires methods of attack to be minimally 
harmful in rendering a warfighter hors de combat 
or unable to fight.
Soldier Enhancement: Medical or biologi-
cal intervention introduced into a soldier’s body 
designed to improve warfighting performance, 
appearance, or capability besides what is neces-
sary to achieve, sustain or restore health.
Therapy: An intervention or treatment in-
tended to alleviate a condition suffered by a patient, 
elevating his or health closer to normal.
